Like the Sweet Sound of an Echo

In the older, undated edition, this piece follows "Counsel to Chödrak and Wangchuk Rabten," separated by a section break. Clearly, it was written for the same two disciples. In the 2017 edition, it is cataloged simply according to the first few words of the first line. We, therefore, supply a more appropriate title based on the piece's final line.  ↩

This last line is tentative. We believe he is simply listing the items his students sent him as gifts while he was in retreat. It is unclear which teachings or instructions (bslab ston) he is referring to; perhaps his disciples had compiled some particularly beautiful verses for his pleasure.  ↩

A partial summary of Sudhana’s relationship with Maitreya in in the Avataṃsaka Sūtra is as follows: “Toward the end of his journey Sudhana is directed to Maitreya, the Buddha-to-be, personification of loving-kindness. Sudhana comes to a great tower, the 'tower of the treasury of adornments of the illuminator [Vairocana],' which represents the cosmos as seen by bodhisattvas. He reflects that this tower is the abode of bodhisattvas who understand the emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness of all things, the abode of those whose intent it is to benefit all beings, of those who have already left all worlds but who appear in the world to edify people, of those who observe emptiness yet do not form the view of emptiness, of those who course in formlessness yet always enlighten those who cling to forms, of those who practice wishlessness yet do not give up the will for enlightening practice, and so on; in this vein Sudhana extols the qualities of bodhisattvas. Then Maitreya appears. He praises Sudhana before a great assembly and then extensively praises the determination for enlightenment. Finally Maitreya has Sudhana enter the tower, which is then seen to be boundlessly vast, as extensive as space, and magnificently adorned with all manner of embellishments. Sudhana also sees that inside the tower are innumerable similarly adorned towers, each as extensive as space, yet not interfering with each other” (Cleary, Entry Into the Inconceivable, 7).  ↩

Śāntarakṣita, who is said to have been born into a royal family in the Ancient Kingdom of Zahor, which covered parts of contemporary Bihar and Bengal in eastern India.  ↩

Pratimokṣa is the Sanskrit term meaning "toward liberation." It connotes the most fundamental buddhist ethical vows up through the elaborate codes of conduct adopted by fully ordained nuns and monks.  ↩

Compounded or relative virtue is positive action that is nevertheless limited by being bound to the framework of the “three spheres” ('khor gsum) of agent, object, action. Uncompounded virtue, on the other hand, transcends such a limited framework. In his oral explanations of Khenpo Kunpal’s commentary on Śāntideva’s Bodhisattvacāryāvatāra, Khenpo Chöga says, “Perfect enlightenment is only reached if one is utterly free from all fixations. You must be free from all fixations on ‘compounded virtue’” (Kretschmar, Drops of Nectar, 111).  ↩

"In isolation" renders res 'jog, which is more literally "alternatingly" or "one at a time."  ↩

Alt. "Compounded virtue is a hindrance to no one," meaning do not belittle conventional ethics.  ↩

This quotation is from the first stanza of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra. The Padmakara Translation Committee translates the full stanza the following way: “The Shravakas and those halfway to buddhahood are born from the Mighty Sage/ /And Buddhas take their birth from Bodhisattva heroes./ /Compassion, nonduality, the with for buddhahood for others’ sake/ /Are causes of the children of the Conqueror” (Padmakara, Introduction to the Middle Way, ch. 1.1). For alternative translations, see Huntington, The Emptiness of Emptiness, 149 and Dzongsar, Introduction to the Middle Way, §H3.  ↩

The verb in this line is the somewhat uncommon 'gongs ('gong ba), an archaic term later replaced by zhum pa and skrag pa (to be disheartened or afraid), as well as smad pa (to disparage). Since the subject of the verb is marked by the agentive particle yis, it is more appropriate to choose the transitive verb smad pa, as in "to object" or "have a problem with."  ↩

For the sake of accessibility, this is a loose rendering of what can be taken as more technical language reflecting Madhyamaka reasoning. A more literal translation might be, "To ascertain the mode of appearance of the object of negation." The disciples Khenpo Ngaga is addressing in this letter would have been well versed in such terms, so they would not have related to them as technical jargon. For this reason, we simplify the language in translation.  ↩

Here, for the sake of clarity, we restate the subject, "what must be negated." We do not find this exact line in Longchenpa’s work, but “establishing the negandum” is a major theme in buddhist philosophical literature and “true existence” (bden grub) as negandum is discussed extensively throughout the Precious Treasury of Philosophical Systems. For example, Longchenpa writes, “Something that occurs through interdependent connection is by nature devoid of true existence, as is the case, for example, with a reflection” (Barron, Precious Treasury of Philosophical Systems, 109). Khenpo Ngaga, in his Guide to the Words of My Perfect Teacher, uses the same phrasing that we find in these lines, but in a less abstract discussion about how the self appears to us as having true existence, even though it does not (see page 211 and 311n231). Likewise, as Khenpo Ngaga refers to here, such statements about “true existence” being what needs to be negated in the view are found all over Longchen Rabjam’s Trilogy of Rest. For example, in Finding Rest in the Nature of the Mind, he writes, “The object and the mind itself are not two things./ /They’re one in primal purity./ /Therein, adopting and rejecting are not two./ /There’s no one-sided affirmation or denial./ /All appearance is devoid of true existence;/ /All arising is by nature empty./ /Everything is equal and beyond all references” (Padmakara, Finding Rest in the Nature of the Mind, ch. 10.26).  ↩

Famous words of Tilopa to Nāropa: bu snang bas mi ‘ching zhen pas ‘ching/ /zhen pa chod cig nA ro pa/ /, which Longchenpa cites (klong chen rab ʼbyams pa dri med ʼod zer, rdzogs pa chen po ngal gso skor gsum, 77).  ↩

"Not singular or plural" is one of the "four great reasonings" of Madhyamaka. Mipham and Khenpo Nüden explain, "In short, all conditioned and unconditioned phenomena cannot be shown to have any true singularity, and since this is not established, plurality that is made up of what is singular must also remain unestablished" (Four Great Logical Arguments of the Middle Way).  ↩

The argument of “neither one nor many” (gcig du bral) is one of the Four Great Logical Arguments of the Middle Way (dbu ma’i gtan tshigs chen po bzhi), or the “Diamond Splinters” (rdo rje gzegs ma). Mipham and Khenpo Nüden explain, "In short, all conditioned and unconditioned phenomena cannot be shown to have any true singularity, and since this is not established, plurality that is made up of what is singular must also remain unestablished" (Four Great Logical Arguments of the Middle Way).  ↩

In “Seeds of the Four Philosophical Schools,” Khenpo Ngaga defines the Svātantrika system in the following way: “Svātantrikas emphasize a ‘nominal ultimate’ that relates to the post-meditation and involves assertions. Theirs is primarily an approach for individuals who progress gradually. Thus, in this system, relative reality is divided into the false and correct relative… According to the reasoning of 'neither one nor many' external and internal phenomena ultimately lack inherent existence. Yet while lacking true existence, they still appear unceasingly through dependent origination. Emptiness and dependent origination are thus an indivisible unity.” The Prāsaṅgika system is described thus: “The Prāsaṅgika approach is concerned with the state of meditative equipoise that is free from all assertions; it is intended primarily for individuals capable of sudden development. Here, there is a subtle object of negation, which is the Svātantrika clinging to relative existence and ultimate non-existence. This subtle form of clinging is here regarded as an object of negation.”  ↩

Pettit explains that Mādhyamikas divide “valid cognitions by way of their object—conventional and ultimate. According to Madhyamaka, whatever exists conventionally is said to be devoid of inherent existence (svabhāva, rang bzhin). Conventional phenomena are known by conventional valid cognitions (tha snayd dpyod pa’i tshad ma). Conventional valid cognition is necessary for understanding the mundane aspects of causality, and for differentiating out-and-out falsehoods (for example, the appearance of a snake) from what actually is the case (for example, a coiled rope). Conventional valid cognition does not know how things exist (gnas), but how they appear (snang). The nature (svabhāva) of all things is emptiness, the ultimate truth (paramārtha, don dam), which is known by ultimate valid cognition (don dam dpyod pa'i tshad ma). Ultimate valid cognition concerns the way things actually exist, regardless of how they appear to exist” (Pettit, Mipham’s Beacon of Certainty, 108).  ↩

Without a commentary, it’s difficult to infer exactly what Khenpo Ngaga means with this strong statement. In forthcoming translations and studies of his Madhyamaka and epistemological writings, perhaps we will hear more about his position on conventional validating cognition. For now, we must lean on discourses on the topic by Khenpo Ngaga’s influential senior contemporary in Nyingma philosophy, Mipham Rinpoche. For one analysis of Mipham’s discourse, see Pettit, Mipham’s Beacon of Certainty, 107–111; Koppl, Establishing Appearances as Divine, 83–8; Duckworth, Mipam on Buddha Nature, 75 and 234 n67; Dorji Wangchuk, “Where Buddhas and Siddhas Meet,” 277–78. Since Khenpo Ngaga does not give explicit instructions here about how to understand conventional validating cognition, we can only speculate that he is encouraging these students to make special effort to study that profound topic for the insights it can yield. In the Nyingma philosophy of Mipham and presumably Khenpo Ngaga, conventional validating cognition is divided into two: “the conventional valid cognition of impure limited perception’ (ma dag tshur mthong tha snyad dpyod pa'i tshad ma) and ‘the conventional valid cognition of pure perception’ (dag gzigs tha snyad dpyod pa'i tshad ma)” [Pettit 108]. To oversimplify it, contemplation of the first of these conduces to Madhyamaka insights; contemplation of the second conduces to tantric insights and leads the practitioner to the ultimate insights of the Great Perfection. On this progression, Mipham writes, “The analysis of other vehicles’ philosophical systems/ /Reveals their progressive purity, which culminates here [in the Great Perfection]./ /Thus the way this is established/ /Through the valid cognition of stainless wisdom/ /Is found in all the interpretative commentaries and tantras And in the analysis of Dharmabhadra” (Pettit 212).  ↩

The Sanskrit term evaṃ signifies the union of wisdom (e) and method (vaṃ), emptiness and bliss, mother and father, and other associated dyads. (See Trungpa, Glimpses of Space; Arnold, As Long As Space Endures. Here, “the path of evaṃ” is being used as a synonym for the Vajrayāna. As he exhorted his students to engage in rigorous philosophical study above, here he is reminding them that if they get carried away with a lot of tantric ritual without penetrating to the deeper meanings, it will just be a waste of time. In common contexts, evaṃ simply means “thus,” as in the sūtra opening, “Thus have I heard” (evaṃ mayā śrūtaṃ).  ↩

This is in line with the ultimate truth according to Mipham: “The coalescence (yuganaddha, zung 'jug) of appearance and emptiness is the nonconceptual, final ultimate (aparyāyaparamārtha, rnam grangs ma yin pa'i don dam), and is the object of nondual gnosis of sublime beings” (Pettit, 109). Coalescence qua ultimate in Mipham’s philosophy is the topic of Dorji Wangchuk’s excellent essay, “Where Buddhas and Siddhas Meet: Mipham’s Yuganaddhavāda Philosophy.”  ↩

Broadcasting secrets to an unsuitable audience is one of the fourteen root downfalls of the Vajrayāna. See Aśvaghoṣa, Summary of the Root Downfalls of the Vajra Vehicle.  ↩

Longchen Rabjam’s yid bzhin rin po che’i mdzod "in twenty-two chapters, and its auto-commentary, Pema Karpo (pad+ma dkar po), with associated treatises" provide a "survey of the whole range of Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrine, elucidating the ways of study, analysis and training in Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna" (Thondup, The Practice of Dzogchen, 155).  ↩